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RECENT CASES
AGENCY
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT EXTENDED TO SPONSORED RECREATION
The Allis Chalmers Company entered athletic teams in city-wide indus-
trial leagues. Through its Supervisor of Athletics, the company recruited
players from among the plant employees, provided them with the appropriate
uniforms and equipment, and paid other incidental expenses. No employee
received wages for playing and none were compelled to participate in the
games. Haas, while playing on the company golf team, drove a ball without
calling "Fore," the game's customary warning signal. The ball struck Rogers,
a golfer on an adjacent fairway, who sued the company to recover for his
injury. The court directed a verdict for the company at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's opening statement on the ground that Haas had not been acting
within the scope of his employment at the time the injury occurred. On
appeal, the ruling was affirmed. Rogers v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 88 N.
E.2d 234 (Ohio App. 1949).
Company sponsorship of industrial recreation has become commonplace
in the last two decades.' The problem of when an employer will be held liable
to a third person injured by an employee engaged in company-sponsored
recreational activity will arise with increasing frequency. 2 To approach
uniformity and certainty in the application of respondeat superior to this
situation, it is essential to understand the rationale behind ever holding an
employer liable for the torts of his employee. The underlying reasons for
the doctrine will determine the limitations of its application. Rationales
1. With the acceptance of the 40 hour-5 day week, the question of whether the com-
pany should concern itself with the employees' free time was thrust to the fore. The
answer has been summarily stated: "Foolish, indeed, is the employer who does not recog-
nize that absenteeism can be minimized, loyalty engendered, production increased, fabu-
lously in some instances, by proper provision of a chance for the employees to live vitally,
richly, fully in their cherished off-the-job time." ROMNEY, OFF THE JOB LIVING 163
(1945). A survey of 2700 companies conducted in 1939 showed that 44.6% of them
sponsored athletic teams and that 37.4% of them sponsored picnics and outings. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT No. 20, STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY 14 (1940). Expansion
was shown by a study made in 1945 showing 56% of the reporting companies to be spon-
soring programs, 75% of them spending in excess of $2000 yearly on the program, and
49% of the companies providing full or part-time leadership. WILLIAMS, CRITERIA FOR
THE ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RECREATION PROGRAMS 9 (un-
published thesis in the Indiana University Business School Library, 1948).
2. Industry has increasingly accepted responsibility for injuries to employees during
recreational activity. In 1940, a survey showed that 40% of the companies which spon-
sored recreation also provided accident insurance covering the activity. In 1945, 48% of
the companies were carrying such insurance. WILLIAMS, CRITERIA FOR THE ORGANIZATION
AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RECREATION PROGRAMS 41, 45 (unpublished thesis in
the Indiana University Business School Library, 1948).
RECENT CASES
offered by the authorities are: the master controls the servant, profits from
his activity, selects him; the servant is the master's alter ego; the employer
has the deeper pocket.3 Other authorities rely on theories of evidence, indul-
gence, danger, and revenge.4  Of the multiple rationales advanced, some are
obviously fictions while others would extend liability beyond accepted limits.
None of these views is a satisfactory explanation of respondeat superior.6
The rationale widely accepted by recent writers is that, as between the
industry and the injured party, society is least harmed by imposing upon in-
dustry the cost of inevitable injuries.7  They reason that since the employee
who commits the tort is often judgment proof, the injured person has no
effective remedy if he must look only to the employee for redress. On the
other hand, if the employer is held responsible, he may shift the loss by means
of insurance, and pass its cost on to the consumer through increased prices.
The employer is thereby induced to promote greater caution by issuing acci-
dent-prevention instructions and by enforcing punitive measures against
negligent employees."
Accepting this rationale in answer to why the employer should be held
liable,' the greater problem remains of when respondeat superior should be
applied. All proponents of the foregoing rationale agree that some limita-
tions are necessary.10  These limitations have been expressed in terms of
3. All these rationales are exhaustively discussed in BATY, ViCARIous LIABILITY 148
et seq. (1916).
4. Ibid.
5. E.g., the employer receives the profits from the work performed by his independent
contractors as well as by his agents, however, the employer is not held liable for the torts
of his independent contractor. Tortorici v. Sharp Moosop, Inc., 107 Conn. 143, 139 AtI.
642 (1927) ; Charles v. Barrett, 233 N. Y. 127, 135 N. E. 199 (1922).
6. Mr. Justice Holmes in Guy v. Donald, 203 U. S. 399, 406-407 (1906); BATY,
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 146 et seq. (1916) ; PROSSER, TORTS 472 (1941); Laski, The Basis
of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105-111 (1916).
7. PRossER, TORTS 472-473 (1941) ; Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration
of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584, 586 (1929) ; Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE
L. J. 105, 111-115 (1916) ; Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L.
REv. 339, 340-341 (1934) ; Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COL. L. Rxv. 444, 456-457 (1923).
8. "The effect of being required to pay for an act of negligence by an employee has
the same effect as has the certainty of paying compensation for death or fire upon in-
surance companies. . . . The history of the Employers' Liability Acts and of the Work-
men's Compensation Acts, showing a decreasing mortality in an increasingly dangerous
environment, indicates that the proper place to apply pressure is on the employer." Seavey,
Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 448 (1934).
9. Accetance of this rationale is evident in Adams v. American President Lines, 140
F.2d 476 (1943) ; Hubbard v. Lock Joint Pipe Co., 70 F. Supp. 589 (1947) ; Herr v.
Simplex Paper Box Co., 330 Pa. 129, 147, 198 AtI. 309, 319 (1938) (dissenting opinion).
10. There is undoubtedly a limit beyond which the business can no longer shift nor
absorb the loss. Nor, economically, should costs totally unconnected with producing a
product be charged to the consumer of that product. Further, power to promote the non-
happening of employee torts is lost outside the area connected with the employment.
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584, 593-594
(1929); Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REy. 339, 341 (1934).
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scope of employment. 1 In deciding whether given acts are within the scope
of the employment, the courts have emphasized different tests for the various
types of activities.
12
There have been few respondeat superior cases arising out of recreational
injuries, and none of these have developed adequate tests.13 Though tests
to delimit course of employment have been formulated in Workmen's Com-
pensation cases involving recreational injuries, courts have not regarded these
cases as persuasive in respondeat superior suits. The Ohio court refused to
consider them in the principal case.' 4 However, the tests drawn in compensa-
tion cases to delimit course of employment are logically applicable in a re-
spondeat superior suit.1- In each case the primary issue is whether the
activity is so related to the employer's business as to be within the ambit
of business activity. The purpose for which that determination is made is
identical since the reasoning behind both Workmen's Compensation Acts and
respondeat superior is to shift the cost of inevitable injuries in industry to con-
sumers. 16 Compensation cases, of course, are not controlling on the issue of
11. Joel v. Morison, 6 C. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834). The constant expan-
sion of the concept, scope of employment, has made all but recent cases of doubtful
authority in this field. "In the detour cases, the tendency is more and more to find that
even a very extended detour is within the scope of the employment, and in many jurisdic-
tions, at least, the servant reenters his employment, although far from his sphere of
action, as soon as he decides so to do. . . . Further, the cases now tend to hold that the
master is liable for such personal assaults . . . as are reasonably closely connected with
(the employment) in time and space. . . . There is likewise the spreading 'dangerous
instrumentality' doctrine . . ." Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior" in
HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 453 (1934).
12. E.g., in frolic and detour cases, courts have established a "zone of risk" test which
operates to hold certain deviations of the employee within the scope of the employment if
they fall within certain time and place limitations. Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360, 94
P.2d 590 (1939) ; Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N. Y. 219, 137 N. E. 309 (1922).
13. Ackerson v. Jennings Co., 107 Conn. 393, 140 Atl. 760 (1928) ; Easler v. Downie
Amusement Co., 125 Me. 334, 133 Atl. 905 (1926) ; Stenzler v. Standard Gaslight Co., 179
App. Div. 774, 167 N. Y. Supp. 282 (1st Dep't 1917).
The court in Ackerson v. Jennings, supra, uses a test of "promoting the employer's
business." This standard is too general to be helpful prospectively in finding whether
given activity is within the scope of the employment.
14. The court purported to distinguish the Compensation cases by saying, "a mere
causal connection is held to be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that the in-
jury be received in the course of and arise out of the employment." Rogers v. Allis
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 88 N. E.2d 234, 236 (Ohio App. 1949).
15. To recover in a respondeat superior suit, the agent must have been acting within
the scope of his employment, while under the Compensation Acts, an injury must "arise
out of and in the course of the employment" to be compensable. HOROVTZ, INJURY AND
DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 154 (1944).
16. "Once the courts have recognized this fact, much of the mist which now sur-
rounds respondeat superior will disappear." Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COL. L. REv.
444, 716, 731 (1923). A comprehensive statement of the reasons behind the adoption of
Compensation Acts appears in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 286-287,
94 N. E. 431, 436 (1911).
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ultimate liability because of other differences in the two actions not material
to the issue here involved. 17
The courts in the Compensation cases have been faced with opposing
arguments. One view is that to hold recreational activity within the course
of the employment would penalize and impede the efforts of the employer
to increase the happiness of his employee.'" The opposing view is that if the
expenditure is not ultra vires, the recreational activity necessarily comes within
the course of the employment. 19 The Compensation cases have emphasized
several factors in drawing the tests between these positions. Compulsion
brings the recreation within the course of business activity.20 The recreational
activity is held to be within the course of the employment if the employee
must participate to receive wages,2 or participates in response to a forceful
request of a superior.2 2 If the activity occurs on the premises during a rest
period and is acquiesced in by the employer long enough to become a settled
practice, the activity has been held within the course of the employment.22
17. Under Workmen's Compensation, the employer is responsible for accidental in-
juries without negligence on his part, while in a respondeat superior case the employee's
fault must be established to gain recovery. Compensation Acts have abolished the com-
mon law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant
rule which are available in a respondeat superior suit. The determination of the facts is
by an administrative board in the one instance and by a jury in the other.
18. Industrial Commission v. Murphy, 102 Colo. 59, 62, 76 P.2d 741, 742, (1938).
19. Judge Conway, dissenting in Matter of Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y.
468, 481, 84 N. E.2d 781, 788 (1949).
20. Matter of Huber v. Eagle Stationery Corp., 254 App. Div. 788, 4 N. Y. S.2d 272
(3d Dep't 1938) ; Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d 644
(1943). But see Stout v. Sterling Aluminum Products Co., 213 S. W.2d 244 (Mo. App.
1948) ; Fick v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 58 A.2d 854 (N. J. Workmen's Com-
pensation Bureau 1948) ; Matter of Dearing v. Union Free School, Tonawanda, 297
N. Y. 886, 79 N. E.2d 280 (1948).
21. Stakonis v. United Advertising Co., 110 Conn. 384, 148 Atl. 334 (1930) ; Becker
Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 333 Ill. 340, 164 N. E. 668 (1929).
22. Miller v. Keystone Appliances, Inc., 133 Pa. Super. 354, 2 A.2d 508 (1938). Judge
Conway, dissenting in Matter of Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y. 468, 479, 84
N. E.2d 781, 787 (1949) : "This moral suasion exerted by the employer is a very real
factor in any employment and cannot be ignored by the board or the courts in cases like
the one at bar. Thus, where an activity-different from the employee's regular duties
and even recreational in nature-is encouraged, promoted or subsidized by the employer,
there is a strong compulsion upon the employee to participate in the outside activity."
23. Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 Pac. 372 (1919) ; Conklin v.
Kansas City Public Service Co., 226 Mo. App. 309, 41 S. W.2d 608 (1931) ; Geary v.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 188 P.2d 185 (Mont. 1947); Matter of Brown v. United
Services for Air, Inc., 298 N. Y. 901, 84 N. E. 2d 781 (1949) ; Dowen v. Saratoga Springs
Comm'n, 267 App. Div. 928, 46 N. Y. S.2d 822 (3d Dep't 1944) ; Matter of Piusinski v.
Transit Valley Country Club, 259 App. Div. 765, 18 N. Y. S.2d 316 (3d Dep't 1940),
aff'd, 283 N. Y. 674, 28 N. E.2d 401 (1940) ; Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, 161 Tenn. 470,
33 S. W.2d 90 (1930). Contra: Lutheran v. Ford Motor Co., 313 Mich. 487, 21 N. W.2d
825 (1946) ; Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 276 Mich. 24, 267 N. W. 589 (1936) ; Dunnaway v.
Stone & Webster Engineering Co., 227 Mo. App. 1211, 61 S. W.2d 398 (1933) ; Stevens v.
Essex Fells Country Club, 136 N. J. L. 656, 57 A.2d 469 (1948) ; Theberge v. Public Serv-
ice Electric & Gas Co., 51 A.2d 248 (N. 3. Workmen's Compensation Bureau 1947);
Porowski v. American Can Co., 191 Atl. 296 (N. J. Workmen's Compensation Bureau
1937) ; Ryan v. Industrial Comm'n., 128 Okla. 25, 261 Pac. 181 (1927).
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Power to control, which in application has been equated to power of super-
vision, has been emphasized only to find the activity to be outside the course
of the employment.2 1 In applying these tests to the present case, obviously
the employee should not recover.
The most widely accepted test is that company-sponsored recreation is
within the course of the employment if the employer receives a benefit there-
from. A benefit which has been held controlling is direct receipt of money
from the games.25  However, when the gate receipts are insufficient to pay
the team's expenses, such income is not considered a benefit.28 If the activity
is a reward to the employee for winning a sales contest, such recreation is held
to be within the course of the employment. 27 When the employer receives
a direct advertising benefit from the company team, the activity will be held
within the course of the employment.2 8  Mere indentification of the team by
lettered uniforms, however, is not held to be a direct advertising benefit.29
Hence recovery would not follow in the principal case on any of the above
facets of the benefit test.
A benefit frequently advanced by the claimant is that the employer gains
from the improved employee morale resulting from the activity. It would
not be desirable to impose liability on the employer in all instances where
employee morale is heightened by company-sponsored recreation. Since
liability would always accompany sponsorship under such a rule, many
employers would cease contributing, thus depriving their employees of recrea-
24. Stout v. Sterling Aluminum Products Co., 213 S. W.2d 244, 248 (Mo. App. 1948) ;
Pate v. Plymouth Mfg. Co., 198 S. C. 159, 162, 17 S. E.2d 146, 148 (1941) ; Auerbach Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 195 P.2d 245, 246 (Utah 1948).
25. HoIst v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233, 299 N. Y. Supp. 255
(3d Dep't. 1937); Matter of Chadwick v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div.
714, 299 N. Y. Supp. 256 (3d Dep't. 1937).
26. Industrial Commission v. Murphy, 102 Colo. 59, 76 P.2d 741 (1938) ; Auerbach
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 195 P.2d 245 (Utah 1948).
27. Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N. W.2d 677 (1944) ; cf. Matter of
Kenny v. Lord & Taylor, Inc., 254 N. Y. 532, 173 N. E. 853 (1930); Fagen v. Albany
Evening Union Co., 261 App. Div. 861, 24 N. Y. S.2d 779 (3d Dep't 1941).
28. Matter of Huber v. Eagle Stationery Corp., 254 App. Div. 788, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 272
(3d Dep't. 1938) ; Ott v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ohio App. 13, 82 N. E2d 137 (1948).
Compare Le Bar v. Ewald Brothers Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N. W.2d 729 (1944) (re-
covery granted on facts very close to those in the principal case) with Leventhal v. Wright
Aeronautical Corp., 51 A.2d 237 (N. J. Workmen's Compensation Bureau 1946) (re-
covery denied). Compare Federal Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission, 90 Cal. App. 357, 265 Pac. 858 (1928) with Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 195 P.2d 245 (Utah 1948) ; Matter of Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y.
468, 84 N. E.2d 781 (1949).
29. Tom Joyce 7 Up Co. v. Layman, 112 Ind. App. 369, 44 N. E2d 998 (1942);
Leventhal v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 51 A.2d 237 (N. 3. Workmen's Compensation
Bureau 1946).
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tional opportunities.3 However, a line can be drawn between instances
where the boosted morale results in a planned business benefit and where it
is the incidental result of philanthropy.3 ' Where the expenditure is made not
as a charitable contribution but in expectation of gaining increased produc-
tion, greater harmony, and other benefits, the recreation should be regarded
within the scope of the employment.32 Adopting this view, Compensation
Boards have twice based recovery on this morale factor alone, only to be re-
versed by the courts.33 Although no court has relied solely on this ground, some
cases have combined the morale factor with the nominal advertising on the
uniforms, the two being sufficient benefit to place the activity within the
course of the employment."
That Allis Chalmers anticipated a business benefit from increased morale
may be concluded from the allegations that they provided a Supervisor of
Athletics, publicized the teams' accomplishments, and gave the members a
banquet and prizes. This benefit, coupled with the nominal advertising
alleged was sufficient to bring the activity within the scope of the employ-
ment; at the very least the question should have been left for a jury's
determination.3
.10. Of the nearly 5,000,000 employees of the reporting companies in a 1939 survey,
66.1% participated on athletic teams while 56.1% participated in company picnics. NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT No. 20, STUDIES IN PERSONNEL PoLicy 14 (1940).
One may only speculate as to how many companies would cease sponsorship if liability
necessarily attached. It may be assumed that, especially among the small companies,
some sponsorship would be withdrawn. See Industrial Commission v. Murphy, 102 Colo.
59, 62, 76 P.2d 741, 742 (1938).
31. In a respondeat superior suit similar to the principal case, the court set aside a
directed verdict on the ground that the jury could have found that "increasing the har-
mony, co-operation, and good will among the employees" was a sufficient business benefit
to justify a jury's finding the activity to be within the scope of the employment. Acker-
son v. Jennings, 107 Conn. 393, 140 Atl. 760, 762 (1928). But see Matter of Wilson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y. 468, 473, 84 N. E.2d 781, 784 (1949) wherein the court
said, "Too tenuous and ephemeral is the possibility that such participation might perhaps
indirectly benefit the employer by improving the worker's morale or health or by foster-
ing employee good will."
32. There are good reasons why an employer should sponsor recreation as an incident
of his business even though he must accept, or insure against, liability fo- injuries therein.
There is no easier way to minimize absenteeism, engender loyalty, and increase production
than by well-supervised recreation. RoMNEY, OFF THE JoB LMNG 163 (1945). See note
2 supra.
33. Matter of Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N. Y. 468, 84 N. E.2d 781 (1949);
State Young Men's Christian Association v. Industrial Commission, 235 Wis. 161, 292
N. W. 324 (1940).
34. In Federal Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 90 Cal.
App. 357, 265 Pac. 858 (1929) the company sponsored an employee team and provided the
members with lettered uniforms and equipment. The court held on these facts alone that
an injury during a game was compensable, saying that increased morale plus the adver-
tising of the employer's name and business was sufficient to bring the recreation within
the course of the employment. On this authority, the recreation in the Allis Chalmers
case would be within the scope of the employment. Cf. Ewald v. LeBar Brothers Dairy,
217 Minn. 16, 13 N. W.2d 729 (1944) ; Ott v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ohio App. 13, 82
N. E.2d 137 (1948).
35. Whether an activity is within the scope of the employment is usually a jury
question. Grant v. Knepper, 245 N. Y. 158, 156 N. E. 650 (1927) ; Miller v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 289, 16 N. E.2d 447 (1938).
